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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 
No. 06-1177
                                
ROBERT E. BROWN;
SHIRLEY H. BROWN,
h/w
         Appellants
  v.
INTERBAY FUNDING LLC;
LEGRECA & QUINN REAL ESTATE
SERVICES INC.
                                                                              
On appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D. Del. Civ. No. 04-cv-00617)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
                                                                                
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 17, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: August 18, 2006)
                                                  
OPINION
                                                    
PER CURIAM
Appellants Robert and Shirley Brown (“the Browns”) filed this suit pro se in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware, asserting negligence, fraud, and
1The Browns’ expectations were apparently based on an appraisal they had
obtained prior to Interbay and Lagreca’s involvement.
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discrimination claims against Appellees, Interbay Funding LLC (“Interbay”) and Lagreca
and Quinn Real Estate Services, Inc. (“Lagreca”), in connection with the approval process
for a mortgage loan.  Intending to expand their deli business, the Browns contracted to
buy three parcels of property located at 2617, 2619, and 2625 Market Street in
Wilmington, Delaware for $128,000.  Two parcels were paved parking lots and the third
contained a two-story commercial building.  After abandoning their initial efforts to
obtain financing elsewhere, the Browns applied for a loan from Interbay, a mortgage
lender.  At that time, the Browns anticipated that the appraised value of the property
would be approximately $200,000, making them eligible for 80% financing of the
purchase price with a 20% down payment.1  
Interbay approved the Browns’ loan application subject to an appraisal, which it
then hired Lagreca to perform.  Lagreca appraised the property at $140,000.  Based on
this figure, Interbay notified the Browns that it would only be able to finance 65% of the
purchase price and that the down payment would be 35%.  The Browns rejected this
financing offer, and subsequent attempts to save the deal with Interbay proved
unsuccessful.  The Browns then filed this suit in the District Court, alleging that Lagreca
and Interbay discriminated against them on the basis of their race (African-American) by
producing and relying on a flawed appraisal which altered the financing terms.  After
discovery concluded, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  In an order
3entered January 11, 2006, the District Court granted summary judgment to Interbay and
Lagreca.  The Browns timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Browns
argue that they were entitled to default judgment against Interbay, because Interbay did
not answer the complaint within 20 days after service of the summons and complaint as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A).  The Browns further contend
that the District Court abused its discretion by ignoring evidence of Interbay’s late
answer, failing to rule on the motion for default judgment, and allowing Interbay to
substitute a motion to dismiss for an answer.  We observe at the outset that the District
Court ruled on the motion for a default judgment, denying it on May 11, 2005.  See Dkt. #
95.  We review that denial for abuse of discretion.  See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210
F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).  While the Browns correctly note that Rule 7(a) requires
both a complaint and an answer, they overlook that the time period for filing an answer is
altered when a defendant files a motion under Rule 12.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4).  On
July 19, 2004, exactly 20 days after service of the summons and complaint, Interbay
timely filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  See Dkt. # 8.  Interbay’s
motion was not a “substitute” for an answer.  Rather, the motion merely extended
Interbay’s time to file an answer until ten days after receiving notice of the District
Court’s action on its motion.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).  The District Court
disposed of the motion to dismiss on November 8, 2004.  See Dkt. # 33.  Interbay filed its
2Weekend days and legal holidays are excluded from the computation of any time
period of less than 11 days.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
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answer on November 22, 2004, in compliance with Rule 12(a)(4)(A).2  See Dkt. # 36.  As
its answer was timely filed, Interbay did not “fail to plead or otherwise defend as
provided by [the] rules.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).  Thus, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the Browns’ motion for default judgment.  The Browns’
related arguments that the alleged abuse of discretion deprived the District Court of
jurisdiction and violated the Browns’ constitutional rights are unsupported and
unpersuasive.  Similarly, the Browns were not prejudiced by Lagreca’s initial failure to
respond adequately to their interrogatories.  Indeed, the Browns acknowledge that the
District Court remedied this problem by ordering Lagreca to provide substantive and
meaningful responses.  In light of Lagreca’s prompt compliance with that order, the
Browns have failed to demonstrate any prejudice.
Finally, the Browns repeat their contentions that the appraisal was flawed because
it only accounted for one parcel rather than all three.  In support of this argument, the
Browns assert that Lagreca “impeached” itself in its interrogatory responses when it
claimed to have included the two paved lots in the appraisal, yet asserted that the value of
the lots themselves was unknown.  The District Court addressed these allegations in
connection with the Browns’ negligence and fraud claims against Lagreca.  We agree
with the District Court that the negligence claim fails, because the Browns did not
introduce any expert testimony to establish the standard of care owed to them by Lagreca. 
See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Ewing, Cole, Erdman & Eubank, 711 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir.
3We note that this omission appears to be intentional rather than inadvertent.  In
their motion to strike Appellees’ response briefs, the Browns strenuously argue that
Appellees’ briefs did not address the issues raised in the opening brief, which concerned
only jurisdiction, default judgment, Lagreca’s self-impeachment, and “numerous statutory
and constitutional issues.”  In light of this emphatic statement, we decline to read the
Browns’ opening brief as raising any additional issues.  Moreover, had the Browns
challenged the disposition of the discrimination claims, we would have affirmed the
District Court’s judgment as to those claims.
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1983); Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co. of Eastern Region, Inc., 367 A.2d 999, 1008 (Del.
1976).  The record evidence likewise does not support a fraud claim.  Although the
Browns obviously disagree with Lagreca’s appraisal method, they have not presented any
evidence tending to show that the appraisal constituted a knowingly false statement on
Lagreca’s part.  See Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983). 
Neither can the Browns show that Lagreca intended to use the appraisal to induce them to
act or that they “justifiably relied” on the appraisal, as Lagreca prepared the appraisal
solely for Interbay’s use.  See id. 
As the Browns do not discuss, or even refer to, their discrimination claims in their
brief, we consider those issues to be waived.3  See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(2); Brown v.
Sielaff, 474 F.2d 826, 828 (3d Cir. 1973) (issues not raised in a brief on appeal cannot be
noticed by the court).  The District Court’s judgment is affirmed.  The Browns’ motion to
strike Appellees’ briefs is denied.  To the extent Lagreca’s motion for leave to file a
supplemental appendix is construed as a request to attach the order appealed from, it is
granted.  To the extent that the motion is construed as a request to expand the record on
appeal to include documentation related to Robert Lagreca’s qualifications as an
appraiser, it is denied.  We note that, given the basis for our disposition, this
6documentation would have had no impact on our disposition even had this motion been
granted.
